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Within the context of discussions regarding the 
Constitution and its forming, great emphasis is given to the 
history of the ideas which influenced and/or became a part of 
that document. The general term given to the line of thought of 
which our Constitution is a part is "natural law" theory, 
referring to the rights which the founding fathers, or natural 
law theorists in general, deemed so basic as to be understood. 
Such a doctrine manifests as the "inalienable rights ... life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" in the Declaration of 
Independence, but in a more subdued and practical manner in our 
Constitution. In discussions of this school of thought, three 
important works by three major European political philosophers 
are often the center of the conversation. Jean Jacque Rousseau's 
Social Contract, The Spirit of Laws by Charles Louis de Secondat 
Montesquieu, and John Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government 
provide excellent insight into the school of natural law thought. 
On the surface, it would appear that all three played a major 
role in the development of American natural law thought and thus 
on the formation of the Constitution. In fact, two of the three 
can be shown to be such an influence. Rousseau, however, is 
conspicuously absent both in the interaction of the Constitution 
writers and in the form of the Constitution itself. 
In order to better understand the role of the three 
philosophers in the formation of the Constitution, we will look 
1 
2 
at the major works of each, outlining the theories presented. 
Following that discussion, an exploration of the importance of 
each of the individuals through the private notes and 
correspondences of the founders will help to determine the 
relative prestige each of the theoreticians held within the 
American intellectual community. With that in mind, the last 
section will outline the specific points drawn from the 
philosophical works into the text of the Constitution. 
Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government is not 
long. In fact, Jefferson refers to it as, "Locke's little book 
on Government." 1 However, it contains a thorough discussion of 
the basis of government, its relationship to society and 
individuals, and the source of government's power. "The true 
original, extent, and end of civil government; as understood by 
Locke. 11 2 
Locke begins his discussion of government by explaining 
what he believes to be the "state of nature," explained as: 
"perfect freedom [of men] to order their actions, and dispose of 
their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the 
bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending 
1Thomas Jefferson, New York, to Thomas Mann Randolph Jr., 30 
May 1790, in Julian P. Boyd ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 
vol. XVI (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 449. 
2Richard Ashcraft, Locke's Two Treatises of Government 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 4. 
3 
upon the will of any other man. 113 In this state all are equal 
and have the same rights, which he limits only by disallowing 
infringement on other's liberty or property and by disallowing 
the right of people to destroy themselves (which later becomes 
necessary to the consistency of his theory). In Locke's state of 
nature, man has only one power over another, which Locke 
describes in Chapter two: "Each transgression (which he has 
defined as an infringement on another's liberty or property} may 
be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will 
suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause 
to repent, and terrify other from doing the like."4 Retribution 
and punishment--the natural power of one over another in this 
natural state is limited to punishment. 
Thus man has the natural power to preserve life, 
liberty, and estate from others. However, Locke maintained that 
in some cases, personal power would be inadequate protection. It 
is for this reason that governments are formed. To bring this 
about, people enter into a contract with society which dictates 
that the burden of that protection fall upon society, in return 
for which the individual forfeits personal rights to act in 
retribution or punishment as described above. The right 
replacing the right to act is that of appeal to the government 
3John Locke, On Politics and Education with introduction by 
Howard R. Penniman. Second Treatise on civil Government (Roslyn, 
NY: Walter J. Black, Inc., 1947), Ch. II, Section 4. 
4Locke, Ch. II Section 12. 
4 
for protection. This is the genesis of civil government as Locke 
described it. 
In the government Locke described, every citizen is 
obligated "to submit to the determination of the majority. 115 
Unanimity to Locke was an impossibility to a working government. 
Our own experience with the Articles of Confederation serves as a 
working model to support that idea. To Locke, the citizen is 
obligated to submit to them majority unless that majority 
threatens the life, liberty or property which protection is its 
reason for existence. In such a case the contract would be 
broken by the society, not the individual, and thus the contract 
would be void. 
The ideas outlined in Rousseau's Social Contract also 
fall under the rubric of natural law thinking. However, very 
little of his thought regarding government can be classified as 
original. In fact, upon analysis, it can be seen that a great 
many of his ideas are very similar to those of Locke nearly 100 
years earlier, and Rousseau's thoughts are more theory and less 
detail than those of either Locke or Montesquieu. 
The very basis of Rousseau's thought is also the title 
of his major work. In his plan for ideal government a social 
contract would be established whereby each individual would give 
up his (at this time only males were included} rights for the 
good of the whole. He writes, "Each of us places in common his 
5Locke, Ch. VIII, Section 97. 
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person and all his power under the supreme direction of hte 
general will; and as one body we all receive each member as an 
indivisible part of the whole. 116 Important in this theory is 
again the idea of a basic state of nature, which existed before 
and is thus superior to society. In this state of nature, 
Rousseau explains, each individual has the right to defend 
himself from the encroachments of others, and to generally follow 
his own laws. It is because of the weakness of one against 
another more powerful that civil society is developed as 
described above. In this process, those natural rights which 
existed in the state of nature are conceded to the whole in 
return for civil rights which are granted to individuals by the 
society. 7 The comparisons to Locke are obvious after reading 
this description of his ideas. 
The similarities between Locke and Rousseau continue in 
the plan of government vaguely outlined in the Social Contract. 
Rousseau states that in order to achieve a goal, two things are 
required: a) the will to acquire, and b) the power to execute 
that will. For instance, in order for me to walk across a room, 
first I must want to walk across the room, and secondly I must 
have the skeletal muscle and motor coordination to physically 
move my body by taking steps. Similarly, governments must have 
two parts. The first, the legislative, must be the will of 
society--it must make decisions. The second part, the executive, 
6Jean Jacque Rousseau. The Social Contract. 15. 
7Rousseau, 14 
6 
must carry out the will of the society by physically enforcing 
the rules passed by the legislative. In contrast to Locke, 
Rousseau felt that the executive should be appointed by the 
legislative and be answerable to the legislative--no separation 
of powers. 8 Neverthe_less, it is plain to see how much of 
Rousseau's thinking is a parallel of the Second Treatise. This 
appears to be the crucial factor regarding the Constitution 
writers seemingly ignoring him. 
While Rousseau may be accused of unoriginality, the 
same may be said for many writers on this subject, including 
Montesquieu. However, whereas Rousseau is vague and highly 
theoretical in most of his thought, Montesquieu, in Spirit of 
Laws establishes an extremely specific and practical guide for 
the establishment of government. Additionally, Montesquieu 
includes three different viable systems of government in his 
work, comparing the various aspects of republicanism, despotism, 
and monarchy. While the document as a whole is fascinating, it 
is the portions which discuss republican government which pertain 
to this study. 
Montesquieu defines republican government as, "that in 
which the body or only a part of the people is posessed of the 
supreme power." 9 He suggests that in democracy, the people are 
at once the sovereign, which he defines as that body with 
8Rousseau, 50-51. 
9Charles Louis de Secondat Montesquieu. The Spirit of Laws. 
(Berkeley: University of California Pre~s, 1977), Book II, Ch. 1. 
7 
absolute power, and subject to that sovereign at the same time. 
In this system, decisions and laws must be made and executed. In 
order to carry out such actions, which is truly the function of 
government, a democracy may be required to choose what 
Montesquieu called magistrates, or people qualified to be 
representatives. From this a republic evolves. 10 
Montesquieu defined three types of governmental power 
which were present in all governments, regardless of their 
fundamental organization. The first of these he called 
legislative and defined as the power to enact laws. Secondly, 
executive (a) had the power to decide on peace or declare war, 
direct other foreign affairs, and ensure public security for 
society. Executive (b) could punish crimes and settle disputes 
between parties in society, what we would call judicial power. 
In each type of government, these power structures would manifest 
themselves differently. In a republican form of government, "The 
legislative power is therefore committed to the body of the 
nobles, and to the body chosen to represent the people." 11 
Montesquieu had previously endorsed a distinction by class in 
society (not surprising since he was a baron himself), and this 
statement reflects his belief in representing not only nobles as 
was true in Europe at the time, but also the common people, who 
should have a voice in government. An executive and judicial 
system are also accounted for in Spirit of Laws, but an important 
'°Montesquieu, Book II, Ch. 2. 
11Montesquieu, Book XI, Ch. 6. 
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aspect of defining these three types of power is that, in a 
republic, Montesquieu believed they should all be separate, 
echoing Locke. In this way, the people wouldn't have to fear a 
tyranny or a usurpation of liberty . 12 So we can see that 
Montesquieu was indeed similar to Locke and Rousseau in his 
thoughts, although his arguments depend less on natural rights 
than the other two. What cannot be seen from this broad outline, 
but will borne apparent later, is the detail and practicality 
which made this particular essay so important in the formation of 
the Constitution. 
Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu were discussing much 
of the same material. Government based on the power of the 
people from natural law. It can be seen that many of the United 
States' great leaders of the time were enmeshed with this 
thinking as well. By studying them we can gain a picture of just 
how influencial these three specific thinkers were to the 
formation of the thought of the founders. 
It is obvious from the correspondence of the American 
leaders that Locke's work, as well as that of Montesquieu, was 
considered required reading for all those considering law or 
politics as a career. On one occasion, Thomas Jefferson writes 
to a young man considering law as a career, giving him a list of 
material which should be read. Included on that list is "Locke 
12Ibid. 
9 
on Government," as well as Montesquieu. 13 What is perhaps most 
interesting in perusing Jefferson's correspondence is that while 
Montesquieu was indeed necessary reading, he was also considered 
somewhat dangerous. 
In a letter to Jefferson dated 14 April 1787, a young man 
interested in political science named Thomas M. Randolph Jr. 
tells Jefferson he has been reading such works as Montesquieu and 
Hume. Some time later, Jefferson sends advice back to the man 
which basically approves of this choice, but displays 
reservations as well. Jefferson writes, "In the science of 
government Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws is generally recommended. 
It contains a great number of political truths; but almost an 
equal number of political heresies: so that the reader must be 
constantly on his guard." 14 Besides reading Locke and 
Montesquieu, many of those others recommended by Jefferson are 
themselves representative of especially Lockean thinking. For 
example, Blackstone is on the list to the would-be lawyer and 
wrote, 
the principal aim of society is to protect individuals, in the 
enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them 
by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be 
preserved, in peace, without that mutual assistance, and 
intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly 
and social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and 
13Thomas Jefferson, New York, to John G. Jefferson, 11 June 
1790, in Julian P. Boyd ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson vol. 
XVI (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 481. 
14Thomas Mann Randolph, Jr. letter to Thomas Jefferson 14 
April 1787 and Thomas Jefferson, letter to Thomas Mann Randolph, 
Jr. 30 May 1790, Boyd, Vols. XII, 442 and XVI, 449. 
10 
primary end of human laws, is to maintain and regulate these 
absolute rights of individuals. 15 
Evidence of Lockean thinking is also evident in the 
documents of the day. "The Declaration of Independence" is the 
primary example of this as many of the lines included are almost 
word for word from Locke's Second Treatise. 
As monumental a figure as Thomas Jefferson was, he was 
not directly involved in the main focus of this study, the 
formation of the Constitution. While it is plain Jefferson's 
influence is important, the writing and defense of this document 
was left to men such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. 
Hamilton was not the stereotypical Lockean thinker, nor 
was Montesquieu his primary basis of thought. In fact, Clinton 
Rossiter writes, "he may well be the most unclassifiable man of 
pronounced views in all the history of American thought and 
politics. 1116 Despite this, we can see that at the very least he 
considered both Locke and Montesquieu to be necessary reading, much 
as did Jefferson. Not usually one to appeal to sources other than 
reason, he does so in his essay, "A Farmer Refuted," suggesting, "I 
would recommend for your perusal, Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke, 
Montesquieu, and Burlemaqui." Hamilton also cites Montesquieu 
15Blackstone Book I Chapter I, p. 124, quoted in Alexander 
Hamilton, "A Farmer Refuted," in Harold C. Syrett ed., The Papers 
of Alexander Hamilton vol. I (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1961), 88. 
16Clinton Rossiter, Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964), 182. 
11 
several other times, including the speech outlining his plan for 
government at the Constitutional Convention and in several of the 
Federalist Papers. 17 While these examples show the influence of 
Montesquieu, other early writings by Hamilton demonstrate a strong 
Lockean influence. Later writings indicate that he was influenced 
to a great degree by Hobbes and especially Hume, although he seldom 
acknowledges any sources of thought in his work. However, Rossiter 
explains that despite his tendency toward other writers, Hamilton 
was essentially Lockean: "He, too, for all his leanings toward 
Toryism, as an American Whig, and thus a willing prisoner of the 
venerable line of natural law thinkers stretching from Cicero to 
Locke. 1118 
James Madison, who is sometimes called the "Father of the 
Constitution," was obviously 11 ••• a disciple of Locke, Montesquieu, 
and Jefferson. 1119 He is credited with the actual drafting of major 
portions of the Constitution, and it can be seen that much of that 
document comes directly from the Virginia Plan, of which Madison 
was a primary author. In that document, Madison writes that the 
Articles of Confederation should be changed to accomplish the 
17Alexander Hamilton, "A Farmer Refuted," in Harold C. Syrett 
ed., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton vol. 1 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1961), 86. Also ''Speech to the Constitutional 
Convention" and "The Federalist Papers," in Syrett, vol. IV, 185 
and 234. 
18Rossiter, 121. 
19Edward McNall Burns, James Madison, Philosopher of the 
Constitution, (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1968), 47. 
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objects of: "common defence, security of liberty, and general 
welfare."20 These tenets come directly from Locke. In fact, 
Edward Burns explains, "As a disciple of Locke he set up the 
presumption, first of all, of liberty and property as natural 
rights which the state, no matter what its organization, cannot 
invade. " 21 Many of these ideas are also found in Montesquieu's 
writing and it can be seen that while Locke's thinking was indeed 
important, perhaps Montesquieu's practicility had an even greater 
effect. An editorial written by Madison for the National Gazette 
in 1792 indicates his attitude toward both of these philosophers. 
Montesquieu was in politics not a Newton or a Locke, who 
established immortal systems, the one in matter, the other in 
mind. He was in his particular science what Bacon was in 
universal science: He lifted the veil from the venerable 
errors which enslaved opinion, and pointed thw way to those 
luminous truths of which he had but a glimpse himself. 22 
Clearly, Madison, Hamilton, and Jefferson, were 
influenced by the writings of Locke and Montesquieu. What is 
interesting is that despite the reputation he has gained through 
scholarly discussions and histories of natural law thinking, 
Rousseau is very seldom mentioned by any of these three early 
American leaders. Hamilton acknowledges Rousseau once in a speech 
20
"The Virginia Plan," Section I, published in Melvin I. 
Urofsky ed. Documents of American Constitutional and Legal 
History vol. I, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 90-92. 
21Burns, 63. 
22James Madison, "Spirit of Governments." in David Mattern et 
al eds., The Papers of James Madison. (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1991), vol. XIV, 233. 
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defining democracy, but the reference is in passing, as though 
recognizing his thought on the subject, but not acknowledging any 
special importance he may have. 23 The only mention either Madison 
or Jefferson make of Rousseau is in correspondence to one another 
regarding a visit the European philosopher made to Monticello. It 
seems from the letters that Rousseau did not much care for Virginia 
or Jefferson's home. The nature of this correspondence does not 
lead one to believe that Rousseau's thinking was of major 
importance to the two Virginians. Indeed, Rousseau is conspicuous 
by his absence from these papers and the conclusion we must draw is 
that while he was obviously known, he was equally obviously of 
little importance to the thoughts of these founders. 24 
It can thus be seen that many of the major thinkers of 
the time were either partially or wholly influenced by John Locke 
and Charles Louis Montesquieu, and especially by the theories set 
forth in The Second Treatise on Civil Government and The Spirit of 
Laws including, but not only, the major writer of the Constitution, 
James Madison, as well as the two major proponents of the 
Constitution after its drafting, Madison and Alexander Hamilton. 
What is fascinating is that this influence was not merely and 
abstract bias which subtly pressured the Constitution in a certain 
direction. These documents were of primary guiding importance in 
the structure of the new government. 
As discussed above, the ideal government according to 
nHamilton, in Syrett, Vol. V, 150. 
MBoyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. 
14 
Locke was to be based on the contract between individuals and 
society, and while Montesquieu does not make that explicit, he does 
indicate that in a republic the people as a whole are sovereign, 
holding total power. The individual forfeits natural rights of 
action which would be used to protect the rights of life, liberty, 
and property. In return, the government, with the cooperation of 
society, protects those rights. Individuals then gain secondary 
rights, which are appeal to government for arbitration of 
grievances, and retribution and punishment for transgressions 
against that individual's rights. It was these rights which 
Montesquieu call "civil." Therefore, according to Locke or 
Montesquieu, government consists of making laws to protect the 
rights of life, liberty, and property from other members of the 
society or from an outside aggressor, enforcing those laws, and 
adjudicating grievances between parties of the society. 
This explanation of the goals and justification for the 
existence of government is contained in the Preamble to the 
Constitution. To "establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty. 1125 Establishment of justice and 
insurance of domestic tranquility refer to the duty of government 
to settle internal disputes of its members, including punishment 
and retribution if necessary. Provision for common defence and 
promotion of general welfare establishes government's duty to 
25Constitution of the United States of America, Preamble. 
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protect its citizens from outside force, and security of the 
blessings of liberty makes explicit the responsibility of 
government to protect life, liberty, and property. 
Locke envisioned a government where supreme power lay in 
the legislative body, to form "an established, settled, known law 
by common consent."26 Arising from that body, or perhaps elected 
separately, he called for an executive to carry out the laws passed 
by the legislative body, with "power to back and support the 
sentence when right and to give it due execution. 11 27 Locke did 
feel it necessary that the executive be from outside of the 
legislative body to prevent one naturally corruptible person from 
gathering too much power unto him/herself "whereby they may exempt 
themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, 
both in its making and execution, to their own private 
advantage. 11 3 Additionally, Locke provided for a judicial branch 
of government, "in the state of Nature there wants a known and 
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences 
according to established law. 11 29 Montesquieu, as discussed before, 
also believed that a republican government should divide the three 
u Locke, Ch. IX, Section 124. 
27Locke, Ch. IX, Section 126. 
3 Locke, Ch. XII, Section 144. 
29Locke, Ch. IX, Section 12 5. 
16 
types of power into separate branches. He suggests, "When the 
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or 
in the same body of magistracy, there can be then no liberty." 
Further he writes, "Again, there is no liberty, if the power of 
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive 
powers."~ 
This provides the model upon which our government was 
developed. Madison, Hamilton, and others wrote and then defended 
the idea of three separate branches of government. The 
Constitution provides in Article I for a legislative body, namely 
our Congress, in Article II for an executive branch headed by the 
President, and in Article III for a judicial branch separate from 
the other two and headed by the Supreme Court. 31 
Locke wrote, " ... and all of this to be directed to no 
other end but the peace, safety, and public good of the people." 
And further, that the government can have no power or "right to 
destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects."n 
However, the original Constitution, despite claiming to be for the 
purpose of ''securing the Bles~ings of Liberty" provided no method 
for this security. Madison was entirely aware of that situation 
and with the help of others rectified it by adding the Bill of 
3
°Montesquieu, Book XI, Ch.6. 
31Constitution of the United States of America, Articles I, 
II, and III. 
n Locke, Ch. IX, Section 131, Ch. XI, Section 135. 
17 
Rights as the first ten amendments to the Constitution. In most 
cases, the Constitution was ratified only with their inclusion. 
These ten articles secure the personal liberties of speech, 
religion, assembly, and petition of government for settlement of 
grievances, rights which the original of the Constitution ignored. 
Especially important to Locke was the right to control one's own 
property. He wrote, "the supreme power cannot take from any man 
any part of his property without his own consent."" This became 
important to Madison and the writers. The fifth amendment provides 
that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." 34 This due process is in effect the 
law made by the majority and applied evenly to all, which is how 
Locke defines consent in a civil society. 
Just as Locke emphasized specific ideas which were then 
infused into the Constitution, many other parts of that document 
are derived directly from Spirit of Laws. For instance, in Book 
IX, Montesquieu develops the idea that in order for a republican 
government to work, i t must represent a small number of people and 
land or else succomb to what he called ''internal imperfection." 
Unfortunately, a small state would easily be overrun by its enemies 
because of a lack of people and economic strength to defend itself. 
His answer to this quandry was what he called a Confederate 
" Locke, Ch. XI, Section 138. 
34Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment V. 
18 
Republic, in which a number of different smaller republics give up 
some sovereignty to each other for their mutual protection and 
well-being--in effect an extension of the social contract to 
states. 35 Interestingly, our government follows that very plan. 
Each individual state gives up some of its rights to the whole 
(just how many of those rights was not determined until the Civil 
War), in return for the benefits a large country can offer. 
Other, more specific, ideas are also offered by 
Montesquieu. As discussed before, he believed that a democratic 
government should choose qualified people to run the government and 
thus become a republic. He later discusses the need for those 
representatives to be answerable to a specific set of people, so 
that this representative should be chosen locally. In this manner, 
the people could keep the legislative power in their own hands (at 
least in theory). This is indeed what was established in the lower 
house of Congress. Article I Section I states, "The House of 
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second 
Year by the People of the several States." Montesquieu also 
conceived of a bicameral legislature, with both an upper and a 
lower chamber, such as provided in Article I of the Constitution. 36 
Just as Locke, Montesquieu was also concerned about 
individual's rights. Particularly prevalent are ideas about the 
rights of those accused of a crime. He proposes that in republican 
35Montesquieu, Book IX, Ch. 1. 
36Montesquieu, Book XI, Ch. 6; Constitution of the United 
States of America, Article I, Section I. 
19 
government, those accused of a crime must face the decision of a 
group of persons drawn from the body of the people in general, not 
from the legislature, and that the accused should have the right to 
dismiss jury members he or she believes prejudiced in the case. 
Montesquieu also states that a person arrested should be taken to 
answer for the crime "without delay. 11 37 Again, the Constituti on 
provides for these suggestions. The sixth amendment states, "the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an 
impartial jury. 11 38 
Neither Locke nor Montesquieu was physically present at 
the Constitutional convention, nor was Rousseau. However, it can 
plainly be seen that while Rousseau had at best a minimal impact on 
that body, Locke and Montesquieu both played a major part in the 
formation of the Constitution. Most of what they wrote was 
theoretical rather than practical in nature, but much of their work 
was directly applicable to the convention and its goals. They did 
outline the basis of governmental power, its responsibilities, and 
even the three-branched model of government for the founders to 
follow. However, the details were left to the writers to develop 
themselves. "The Declaration of Independence" is as much theory 
and rhetoric as is Locke's treatise, but the Constitution, the 
phoenix from the ashes of the Articles of Confederation, was 
necessarily much more. Arthur o. Lovejoy, in his Reflections on 
Human Nature, pays tribute to the writers: 
37Montesquieu, Book XI, Ch. 6. 
38Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment VI. 
20 
... well aware that their task ... was not to lay down 
abstract principles of political philosophy, not to rest 
the system they were constructing simply upon theorems 
about the 'natural rights' of men or of the States, 
though they postulated such rights. Their problem was 
not chiefly one of political ethics but of practical 
psychology, a need not so much to preach to American 
about what they ought to do, as to predict what they 
would do. 39 
John Patrick Diggins, in his essay "Theory and the American 
Founding", adds, •• ... they were realists who translated the data of 
history into the problem of power and its control."~ 
Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government is certainly 
not perfect, nor was Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws. They WERE 
theoretical rather than practical. Nevertheless, they were self-
evidently of major importance in the drafting and defense of the 
Constitution. It is also true that they were not the only 
political philosopher with an impact on the times. It has been 
stated that Hamilton was very familiar with Hume and Hobbes, 
sometimes even labeled "the American Hobbes," 41 but Burns explains 
39Arthur o. Lovejoy, Reflections on Human Nature, (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), 46. 
40John Patrick Diggins, "Theory and the American Founding," 
in Leslie Berlowitz, Denis Donoghue, Louis Menard eds., America 
in Theory, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 4. 
41Throughout his life it is apparent that Hamilton viewed the 
British political system favorably, and Hobbes' Leviathan is and 
was considered by many to be an apology of that system. 
Nevertheless, Rossiter rejects this label: " ... and Hamilton was 
not a Hobbes any more than Jefferson was a Locke ... America has 
never produced a man who could be assigned without hesitation to 
the company of famous political theorists." From Rossiter, 183. 
21 
the situation well: "American legal theory in colonial times 
represented and accumulation of ideas that ran all the way back to 
Cicero and the Stoics and included the contributions of the 
medievalists, of Bracton, of Coke, and most of all, of Locke"a 
Credit is certainly due the writers and defenders of our 
Constitution. Madison, Hamilton, and others deserve their honored 
place in history, but credit must also be given to the ideas of 
John Locke and Charles Louis Montesquieu. Though not American, 
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